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1. Introduction. 
Since the 1970s, we have witnessed a general liberalisation of 
markets and the creation of multinational companies (MNCs) as global 
players.  This tendency is even stronger in Europe. Indeed, the European 
Single Market (1992) with its four economic freedoms, free movement of 
goods, capital, services and persons, implies that companies operating in 
Europe can move and merge without, almost, any restraint. 
The growing number of multinational companies has raised the 
necessity to create new players and develop strategies from the 
employee side, to prevent the undermining of European workers’ rights, 
which is one of the side-effects of the regime shopping strategy often 
used by the MNCs. As a response to this scenario, “a new transnational 
collective autonomy is slowly emerging” (Sciarra 2009). 
A European form of trade unionism has started consolidating since 
the beginning of the 1990s. In those years, European Trade Union 
Federations (ETUFs), at the time called European Industry Federations 
(EIFs), have strengthen, by increasing the number of affiliates, of total 
membership and enlarging the geographical scope, with the support of 
the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC). However, ETUFs are not 
constantly present at (multinational) company level, indeed that is the 
role European Works Councils (EWCs). The 1994 directive provided for 
the establishment of EWCs in those MNCs having some specific features. 
The aim of the directive was to give a voice to the European workforce 
within the multinational companies, as to try to influence transnational 
corporate decision making (Mueller et al. 2010). EWCs enjoy the right to 
information and consultation and their composition is basically chosen on 
a case-by-case basis. A relationship between ETUFs and EWCs does exist, 
however it is not linear and the respective roles are not clearly defined 
yet. 
In the last two decades, both the actors concerned with 
employment relationship at EU level (EWCs and ETUFs)  have been 
engaging in a form of European transnational collective bargaining (TCB) 
with MNCs. The agreements resulting from these negotiations are also 
called European Framework Agreements (EFAs).  
The importance of EFAs has been acknowledged also by the 
European Commission, which has created a database of TCAs and, in 
2006, has started considering the possibility to strengthen these tools, 
nowadays completely based on practice, with a proper legal framework at 
EU level (Ales et al. 2006). A perspective lately welcomed also by the 
European trade unions, which have developed a proposal for an optional 
legal framework (Sciarra et al. 2014). 
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The issue of EFAs is, therefore, at the forefront, both in the 
practice and among scholars. The literature discussing the subject is 
reach and often based on empirical studies. Overall, the main focus is on 
the development of TCAs, on the negotiating procedures, on the actors 
and the dynamics existing between them and on a potential legal 
framework. The topic of EWCs negotiating EFAs is not new to the 
literature, and several publications present the results of case studies on 
this specific matter. The issue on which actors are legitimized and/or 
should lead the negotiation of a EFA at company level is highly 
controversial, not only among scholars. The debate is triggered by 
several factors, inter alia, the absence of a European legal framework and 
the fact that, in practice, the EWCs have negotiated a quite remarkable 
number of TCAs, without clarity over the role of workers’ organizations, 
even though they are recognised only information and consultation 
rights. 
The issue is also at the centre of a more political debate involving 
national trade unions, European trade unions, as well as EWC members. 
The European trade unions, both the Confederation and the Federations, 
support the supremacy of trade unions over collective bargaining. The 
academic and political debates have not been able to clarify, yet, what 
practical problems can arise during the negotiation of EFAs when is 
exclusively the EWC negotiating on behalf of the workers, and what could 
hamper the conclusion of an agreement widely agreed by all the players 
concerned with the negotiation. Therefore, the aim of this contribution is 
to investigate this point. 
The research question leading my analysis is composed by two 
sub-questions. First, the following question will be answered: what are 
the problems of EWCs negotiating EFAs at company level? In order to find 
an answer, a case study is carried out. The case assessed has proved to 
be a crucial case, since it triggered a change in attitude in both the 
management and the EWC. The negotiation discussed in this dissertation 
ended with the conclusion of the GDF Suez Health and Safety agreement, 
in February 2010 (Original name of the agreement: “Accord de Groupe 
sur les Principes Fondamentaux en Matière de Santé et de Sécurité”). The 
negotiators were the management and the Special Negotiating Body 
(SNB), on behalf of the whole EWC, and the signatory parties were the 
management, the SNB and the EPSU EWC coordinator, who did not have 
a negotiating role.  
The agreement was concluded with the objection of the Italian 
trade unions representing the Italian workforce. The opposition was due 
to both the content and the absence of the European Metalworkers’ 
Federation from the negotiation. Indeed, the Italian EWC member, 
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mandated by the Italian organisations to negotiate, was not allowed to 
sign the agreement. Discussions followed the signature and the 
management finally accepted to both negotiate the subsequent 
agreement with the ETUFs and apply the negotiating procedure they were 
proposing. In order to carry out the case study, a number of semi-
structured interviews were conducted and primary sources consulted.  
The case is complex and interesting under various profiles, as to 
focus in understanding what problems the EWC faced during the 
negotiation, the study mainly draws on the analysis of Waddington 
(2011) and Mueller et al. (2013). The first author illustrates which 
problems the EWC can encounter in relation to the exercise of the rights 
to information and consultation and how ETUFs policies are, or can be, 
applied, in this respect. The second essay is helpful since it frames the 
common attitudes of EWCs towards the negotiation of EFAs.  
Once the problems of a EWC negotiating EFAs are illustrated, it is 
possible to move to the second, and more constructive, part of the 
research question, that is: could the involvement of ETUFs contribute 
overcoming them? 
By “involvement of ETUFs” is meant the application of the ETUFs’ 
policies on transnational collective bargaining, which normally consist of a 
mandate procedure and guidelines on how to conduct the negotiation. 
The answer to this second part of the research question is strongly based 
upon the existing literature and the ETUFs’ documents. Especially, the 
EMF procedure will be assessed by making use of both the federation’s 
documents and the analysis provided by Rueb et al. (2013). Although, 
nowadays, all ETUFs have a mandate procedure, the EMF procedure has 
been chosen for two reasons. First, the EMF was pioneering this policy 
and both the other ETUFs and the author of the optional legal framework 
were strongly inspired by the EMF. Secondly, if the EMF was included in 
the negotiation it would have imposed the application of its mandate 
procedure. 
The research adds empirical evidences to the argument in favour 
of the active involvement of ETUFs in transnational collective negotiation. 
The study shows how the application of a mandate procedure form the 
European federation is likely to foster the cooperation and mutual 
understanding among the national trade unions, strengthen the workers’ 
side and lead to the conclusion of a widely applicable agreement. This 
point is crucial also in respect to the optional legal framework proposed 
by the ETUC in 2014, which envisages a leading role of trade unions in 
the negotiation of EFAs. 
The academic production on the topic is wide and various and it 
won’t be fully covered. The purpose of the first subchapter is to give 
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credit to a vast academic debate that considers TCB as part of the 
transformation of Industrial Relations in Europe. Secondly, the 
developments regarding a European legal framework are reviewed. The 
third chapter moves on from the broader literature on EFAs to focus on 
the more specific subject of EFAs’ agents: EWCs, ETUFs, with a focus on 
their role as negotiating agents of EFAs. The fifth chapter, composed by a 
number of subchapters, aims at describing in detail the case study carried 
out on the negotiation and conclusion of the GDF Suez TCA on Health and 
Safety, and it shows the complexity of the relationship among the various 
players. 
2. Transnational Collective Bargaining at European 
level. 
Kim (1999) mentions some of the reasons why a European form of 
collective bargaining is necessary. First, he argues that “European 
collective bargaining is desired not to replace national collective 
bargaining systems but to complement and coordinate bargaining 
activities at the national level” (Ibid, p.394). Moreover, it is added that it 
would be needed to avoid competition among national trade unions and 
contrast the regime shopping strategy applied by the employers (Ibid, 
p.394). Overall, European Framework Agreements at company level are 
part of that process known as Europeanization of industrial relations (Da 
Costa et al. 2012; Leonardi 2012).  
Among scholars, there is a shared feeling that the process of 
Europeanization of Industrial Relations is still at an embryonic stage 
(Beneyto Rocha 2012). However, the industry level is considered to be 
the most feasible to foster Europeanization of collective bargaining. Also 
from national experiences it can be drawn that the sector or industry 
level may "operate as a catalyst for transnational collective bargaining" 
(Le Queux Fajertag 2001, p. 118). The development of a European 
industrial relations system will be attained especially thanks to the 
establishment of forms of European collective bargaining that will foster 
the convergence between national systems (Marginson and Sisson 1998). 
Transnational collective bargaining (TCB) is a practice carried out 
both at International and European level. In both cases, the number of 
agreements has increased in the last decades (Telljohann et al. 2009a). 
According to the latest data published, by the end of 2013, 127 European 
framework agreements and 140 international framework agreements 
have been signed (Rehfeldt 2015, p. 27). Even though, the texts with 
global scope signed by MNCs and employee representatives have been 
called in different ways, such as agreement on code of conduct or joint 
declaration on human rights and working conditions, they can all be 
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designated as International Framework Agreements (IFAs). These texts 
must be distinguished by the voluntary Codes of Conduct based on 
unilateral initiative, where no negotiation with workers’ representatives 
takes place and labour rights are not really addressed (Papadakis 2008; 
Telljohann et al. 2009a).  
Some authors define EFAs as those TCAs signed by European 
Federations, thus implicitly excluding from the scope of the term those 
agreements signed by EWCs (see authors in Leonardi eds. 2012 and Le 
Queux Fajertag 2001). Other scholars emphasize the role of European 
Works Councils as negotiators of proper Transnational Collective 
Agreements (Jagodzinski 2007; Da Costa Refheldt 2007).  
Several authors have carried out research aimed at collecting data 
on TCB and at providing an overview on the development of this practice, 
in Europe. According to the data collected up to 2013, 92 of the 127 EFAs 
have been signed by EWCs, 19 of which co-signed by ETUFs (Rehfeldt 
2015, p. 27). However, there is no official EU agency collecting the EFAs, 
therefore the estimate is always approximate (Da Costa et al. 2012).     
The interactions between the sectoral social dialogue (SSD) 
(Clawert 2011 on SSD) and transnational collective bargaining (TCB) 
have also been assessed (Léonard Sobczak 2010; Alaimo 2012). The 
scholars agree that the main, and significant, difference lies in the legal 
and institutional framework. Indeed, the company level is experiencing a 
complete absence of legal framework, while the sectoral level enjoys an 
institutionalized context and a clear legal basis formed by articles 152(2), 
154 and 155 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU). Among the diversities, Alaimo points out that EWCs have been, 
by now, the main signatories of EFAs, whereas European Federations are 
engaged in SSD. While Alaimo highlights the differences in the actors 
involved at the two levels, Léonard and Sobczak prefer to underline that 
some of the actors involved in TCB are the same as those engaged in the 
European social dialogue.  
All the commentators agree that TCB is normally favoured by 
employers, while workers’ federations prefer to negotiate at sectoral 
level. Moreover, some procedural aspects are similar, especially as far as 
the follow-up is concerned and a consistent number of topics dealt with 
by the sectoral social dialogue are also present in the transnational 
agreements at company level. This phenomenon is called by Léonard and 
Sobczak a case of “convergence without coordination”. Alaimo also 
underlines a further common point: both SSD and TCB share a critical 
aspect, i.e. non legally binding outcomes (Alaimo 2012). 
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3. A Legal Framework for EFAs? 
The issue of a legal framework for EFAs is at the foreground. 
Negotiation and conclusion of European Framework Agreements at 
company level remains, nowadays, nothing but a practice normally based 
upon the initiative of the employer side. Once the agreement is signed by 
both parties, its enforceability is based exclusively on national legislation 
or in the reproduction of the content through national tools. Moreover, 
the workers’ side cannot easily make use of a European form of collective 
action, given the absence of a transnational right to strike (Lo Faro 2012; 
Da Costa Rehfeldt 2007, p.317; For a deep analysis on the lack of a 
European right to collective action see Bercusson 2008).  
The topic has caught the attention of the European legislator and, 
in 2004, the EU Commission has appointed a group of experts known as 
Ales Group. In 2005, the European Institution officially expressed the 
need for an optional framework for transnational collective bargaining. 
Moreover, it was clearly stated that “the Commission plans to adopt a 
proposal designed to make it possible for the social partners to formalise 
the nature and results of transnational collective bargaining”. The aim of 
a framework as such would be to support both companies and social 
partners (European Commission, 2005).  
It is often argued that a legal framework would clarify several 
aspects, inter alia which are the legitimate actors, thus strengthening the 
legal certainty of the agreements themselves; simultaneously, it would 
still guarantee the autonomy of the social partners (Da Costa and 
Rehfeldt 2007; Ales and Dufresne 2012; Lo Faro 2012). Moreover, 
Sciarra underlines that a supranational legal tool would have an auxiliary 
function, since it could reinforce transnational collective bargaining, by 
supporting and enhancing the autonomy of the social partners (Sciarra 
2010, p. 20). 
However, not everyone agrees in prioritising the European legal 
framework. Indeed, André Sobczak argues that the effective 
implementation of an agreement mainly depends on the active 
involvement and commitment of the social partners, meaning both the 
management and the workers’ representatives, who have a crucial role. 
Consequently, the legal status of the agreement is of secondary 
importance. Among the workers’ representatives that should engage also 
in the follow-up of the agreements the author mentions ETUFs, national 
trade unions as well as EWCs (Sobczak 2012). 
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No proposal has been adopted, yet. However, ever since, three 
expert groups have intensively worked to concretely frame this option1. 
Obviously, the bargaining agents at European level are discussed also in 
these legal studies. 
The latest development towards a legal support for EFAs comes 
from an ETUC’s project. The European Confederation appointed three 
European labour lawyers in order to draft the project for an optional legal 
framework (Sciarra et al. 2014). The project was elaborated together 
with the ETUFs and ETUC. Especially, the Confederation supported the 
idea to consider the IndustriAll-Europe procedure (previously EMF 
procedure)  for the negotiation of EFAs, as a basis to elaborate the 
proposal (Dufrense 2012). The document underlines the “optional”, but 
“legal”, character of the proposal. Indeed, the aim is to provide a legal 
tool which has not a compulsory character for every actor engaging in 
transnational bargaining, but exists for those actors who clearly express 
their will to give the EFA legal protection.  
4. Negotiating agents at European level: European 
Trade Unions Federations and European Works 
Councils.  
The literature is rich of contributions assessing how the 
negotiations of EFAs are carried out and by whom. Moreover, the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the EWCs also provide insights 
over the role of EWCs as bargaining agents (The latest case studies on 
TCB at European level have been published in Leonardi eds. 2015). At the 
same time, a number of authors and the European Trade Unions are 
arguing that, notwithstanding the growing number of EFAs concluded by 
EWCs, the trade unions are the only actors truly legitimized to negotiate 
and conclude on behalf of the European workforce. Especially, European 
Trade Union Federations, mandated by the national affiliates, should 
conduct the negotiations.  
Besides the arguments stressing the lack of legitimacy of the EWC 
to negotiate EFAs, it is not clear whether EWCs are practically able to 
successfully negotiate and conclude collective agreements. In other 
words, it has not been assessed, yet, if the EWCs are always able to 
overcome the problems that they may encounter during the negotiation, 
in order to achieve common goals and sign widely approved agreements 
(and not just sign a text, no matter under which conditions). Moreover, 
even if the ETUFs’ policies towards EWCs have been analyzed, the studies 
                                                 
1 Ales et al. 2006; Rodriguez et al. 2012 ; Sciarra et al. 2014. 
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published so far have never tried to make use of the ETUFs’ policies on 
the negotiation of EFAs, that is the mandate procedures, in order to 
understand whether they could provide a solution to the difficulties that 
the EWC may not be able to face on his own. 
The purpose of the research is to understand whether the 
negotiation of Transnational Collective Agreements, with European scope, 
involving as bargaining agents only the management and the EWC, 
presents some specific problems that can be avoided if the ETUFs’ policies 
on TCB are applied. Among the literature mentioned in this chapter, the 
analyses conducted by Waddington (2011) and Mueller et al. (2013) are 
particularly useful in order to assess which problems may arise, while the 
EMF procedure and the related analysis provided by Rueb at al. (2013) 
are used to conclude the study. This special case has been chosen since 
the European Metalworkers’ Federation has been pioneer in the 
development of such a strategy, indeed the other ETUFs have followed 
the EMF's example. However, the EMF procedure remains the most 
detailed and comprehensive one. In addition, if EMF would have been 
involved in the Health and Safety agreement negotiation, it would have 
very likely imposed the application of that procedure. 
4.1 Which link between ETUFs and EWCs? (an introduction). 
What could be called a European form of trade unionism has 
started its meaningful development in the early 1990s. The most part of 
national trade unions existing in Europe are affiliated to the European 
Trade Union Federations (ETUFs), which in turn, are members of the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC).  
However, ETUFs are not constantly present at (multination) 
company level, indeed that is the role European Works Councils (EWCs). 
EWCs have been created in order to give a voice to the European 
workforce within the MNCs in Europe, as to try to influence transnational 
corporate decision making (Mueller et al. 2010). 
A directive approved in 1994 (Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 
1994) provided for the establishment of European Works Councils 
(EWCs). The directive, entered into force in 1996, had the aim “to 
improve the right to information and consultation of employees” 
(Directive 94/45/EC Art. 1 par.1) at European level. The 1994 directive, 
as well as the recast directive, does not provide for any legal basis for the 
EWC to negotiate collective agreements with MNCs (however the issue is 
debated, for further elaboration on the topic see Frosecchi 2015, pp. 270-
276). 
The agreements to put in place a EWC have often been closely 
followed, not to say lead, by the ETUFs, especially the EMF was strongly 
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engaged in this activity. Notwithstanding the absence of a role for the 
ETUFs in the directive (Mueller et al. 2010, p.514), in 1994, the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation put in place a Task Force to supervise the 
negotiations of EWCs, and also other ETUFs followed the example. Since 
that time EWCs became “at the centre of the EIFs’ company-related 
activities” (Ibid, p. 514). Later, in 2002, this body assumed a permanent 
connotation as the Company Policy Committee (Dufrense 2012, p. 110; 
Waddington 2011, p. 511). 
The EMF had a pioneering role in transnational workers’ 
representation at company level. Indeed, after the approval of the 
directive, it drafted guidelines on how to maintain a fair connection 
between trade unions and EWCs. A key step was the  development of a 
new figure: the EWC coordinator, that should be appointed for each EWC 
(Telljohan et al. 2009a, p. 58). The ETUF EWC coordinator has a central 
function: he has to maintain the linkage between the two bodies of 
European level workers’ representation (Rueb et al. 2013, p. 42). 
Especially, the EMF EWC Coordinator is "generally a union officer from the 
majority union of the company headquarters" appointed by the European 
Federation itself (Da Costa et al. 2012  p.125). “The main task of this 
coordinator was to ensure a constant flow of information between the 
EWC, national trade unions and the EMF” (Telljohan et al. 2009a, p. 58) 
and to ensure transparency (Ibidem). As a matter of fact, the role of the 
EWC coordinator varies depending on many factors, inter alia, the size of 
the company or its origins and the type of EWC he is involved in. For 
instance, only in some cases, the EMF EWC coordinator is really keeping 
the European trade union constantly updated on the EWC activity (Muller 
et al.  2011, p. 223; EMF 2000). 
Besides the specific figure of the EWC coordinator, all ETUFs have 
tried to remain involved in the EWC activities, mainly by providing 
support and facilitating coordination. Especially, the Federations sustain 
the EWC with translation services,  training, working materials; they set 
up databases containing detailed and updated information about all EWC 
existing and their activities, including negotiations and they provide 
political supervision (Mueller et al. 2010, p. 515). 
4.2 EWCs and the academic unrest. 
Besides the literature offering data on quantitative and historical 
elements of EWC, the scholars have focused also in assessing this 
institution from a qualitative point of view. With the 1994 directive, a 
tough debate between academics started. The arguments have been 
divided into two main branches: Euro-pessimists and Euro-optimists (see, 
inter alia, Marginson Sissong 1996 and Streeck 1997). This debate is still 
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ongoing, even if to a lesser extent. As a consequence, the scholars that 
contributed to the debate are numerous.  
The literature on EWCs of the last years has tried to move forward 
from the classical debate, mainly through qualitative analysis of single 
EWCs, by applying case study methodology.  
Overall, a number of researchers found out that, according to the 
respondents, all EWCs, to different extents, are useful for dealing with 
the different interests within the company and for improving employees’ 
rights. However, their rights provided for by the Directive are not 
sufficient. Moreover, no discussion with the management, in order to face 
issues as productivity and competitiveness, is conducted;  the employee 
are not interested in EWC’s activities, especially because of the lack of 
information about these bodies, which implies that employees often do 
not know which are the activities of EWCs and struggle in understanding 
how the workers could be affected (Gold and Rees, pp 549-550). A lack 
of sufficient competence of the EWC representatives is also a problem. 
According to the respondents the unions should provide adequate 
training, as well promoting the role of EWCs at various levels (Hertwig et 
al. 2011; Gold and Rees 2013). 
Other authors paid more attention to the internal dynamics of a 
single EWC. Timming (2010) studied a UK-based EWC, from the UK and 
Dutch perspectives. The purpose was to understand how national 
industrial relations (NIRSs) influence, first, the “social psychology of 
workers’ representatives”, second, the representatives’ willingness to 
form cross-national alliances (Ibid, p. 522).  The author found this EWC 
as belonging to the “symbolic” typology2. Moreover, he highlighted that 
the Dutch delegates were at ease with the role of the EWC, while there 
was uncertainty among UK delegates. Overall, he concluded that EWCs 
are more successful in promoting workers rights beyond borders due to 
some interrelated factors: identity, culture, material interests, 
composition of the MNC, managerial strategy and the economic 
environment (Timming 2010, p. 531).  
The fact that the relationship between national trade unions and 
EWCs is ambiguous has been showed by Hann (2010)’s case studies. 
Indeed, the author shows even in case of unionized EWCs, trade unions 
members sitting in the EWC are not always aware of the respective trade 
union strategies and the lack of funding of the organization makes it hard 
                                                 
2 Lecher in 2001 considered three possible types of EWCs. Symbolic EWCs, where not real 
participation takes place; service-oriented, where the only activity revolves around 
information; project-oriented EWC which implies some kind of cooperation among workers 
and a common agenda; participative EWCs are  the ones where it is possible to find “real 
consultation, negotiation and transnational links”. 
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for them to support strategies at international level. Last, national trade 
unions have different understandings of which role EWCs should have and 
this strongly influences the development of different strategies in their 
respect (Ibid). 
Waddington (2003) studied European Works Council (EWC) 
representatives from six different countries. The findings presented by 
the author can be summarized as follows. First, the country of origin of 
MNCs is a key factor on how the EWC acts/develops; the perception on 
EWCs differs depending on the nationality of the representatives. There is 
a consent on the need to revise the directive to widen the scope of action 
of EWCs, as well as to specify the rules for information and consultation, 
to improve their quality and effectiveness (Ibid).  
In 2011, Waddington published the results of a further study 
assessing the level of actual performance of European Works Councils in 
relation to ETUFs’ policies.  Overall, the author argues that EWCs are 
influenced by trade unions’ policies, but this impact should increase and 
become wider. The quality of information and consultation at EWCs is 
poor, often much less than what provided for by the EWC establishing 
agreement. However, it is underlined that these bodies are still “an 
institution in process” (Waddington 2011, p. 510). 
As far as the main ETUFs’ policy is concerned, that is the EWC 
coordinator, the author notices that two are the risks. First, that the EWC 
coordinator is not appointed at all. Second, that the quality of the EWC 
coordinator is not sufficient to strengthen the EWC and increase its 
effectiveness, especially where the coordinator does not engage with the 
EWC. Indeed, the author stresses that it is not enough to enhance the 
number of EWC coordinators, but also the quality of their presence and 
involvement must be increased (Waddington 2011, p. 526). 
A further source of difficulty concerns the fact that EWC members 
have to rely on national unions for support and training, but formal and 
informal communications with trade unions are not homogeneous. 
Indeed, a number of EWC representatives is not supported at all by trade 
unions. Anyway, even where the representatives are backed up by the 
national trade unions the EWC is not homogeneous, since national unions 
can, or are willing to, make use of different amounts of resources for this 
purpose and the EWC representatives’ preparation turns out to be 
different. As a consequence, a real transnational identity with EWCs can 
hardly develop. In addition, among the main problems, the author found 
a lack of communication among the EWC members, besides the formal 
plenary meetings of the EWC (Waddington 2011). 
To sum up, EWCs function better when the members are 
unionized and a ETUF representative is actively taking part in the EWC 
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(Waddington 2011, p. 526). Waddington’s study shows that information 
and consultation at EWCs are better where the ETUFs policies are applied 
and there is the support of ETUFs representatives. Indeed, the author 
concludes that a way to improve the performance of EWCs is “to increase 
the number and the quality of EWC coordinators” (Ibid, p. 526). 
4.3 A trade union supremacy over collective bargaining (also) at 
European level? 
Mueller et al. included, among the controversial issues around 
European Framework Agreements, the choice of which are the actors that 
should take on the negotiating role. According to the authors the choice 
could fall on  “the European Works Councils and/ or the affected national 
trade union organizations, and/or the relevant European or global trade 
union federations” (Mueller et al. 2011, 219).  
The legitimacy of whom is negotiating on the workers’ side is one 
of the main problems related to EFAs, that, according to most scholars, 
could be solved by a European legal framework (Da Costa Rehfeldt  2007 
p.317; Sciarra 2010; Ales et al. 2006). 
The relationship between the EWCs and ETUFs is complex, since 
EWCs, on the one hand, enjoy autonomy, but on the other hand, in many 
cases the ETUFs, especially the European Metalworkers’ Federation, 
played a key role in negotiating the agreements to set up the EWC itself. 
The relationship becomes even more complex when the negotiation of a 
EFA is at stake. As a matter of fact, notwithstanding that the ETUFs are 
more and more leading the negotiations, the process of EFAs is mostly 
triggered by EWCs, which often conclude agreements independently (Da 
Costa et al. 2012; Mueller et al 2011, p. 221; Telljohann 2009a). 
The strong distinction between EWCs and trade unions is due to 
the fact that the European bodies could be, at least potentially, 
completely independent and unrelated to trade unions. For instance, that 
is the case where no EWC representative is a trade union member. 
Obviously, also the contrary is possible and EWCs can be fully unionized, 
thus appearing as real trade union bodies at company/European level 
(Mueller et al. 2011, p. 221). However, even in those cases, either 
internal dynamics or too different national perspectives can lead to 
malfunctioning negotiations by EWCs (see EWC case studies in the 
previous chapter). In addition, Cilento (ETUC Adviser) states that 
“experience shows that [within EWCs] good trade union practices are not 
frequent, not enough structured and likely to fade away” (Cilento 2012, 
p. 122). 
The approach of EWCs towards the specific activity of negotiating 
collective agreements has not been widely studied in a qualitative way. 
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So far, only a publication of the European Trade Union Institute has 
studied this aspect through interviews (Mueller et al. 2013). The authors 
investigated on both formal and informal arrangements between EWC 
and the management, with a special focus on “the attitude of the actors 
towards a negotiating role” (Ibid, p. 24), in order to understand which 
are the prospects for a future development in EWCs role. The study 
suggests that a notable number of EWCs have gained a participative role 
and, especially EWC of MNCs with German headquarter have concluded 
several formal and informal agreements. This findings demonstrate that, 
at this stage, the critics to the EWCs by Streeck are not realistic (Ibid, p. 
86). Therefore, the number of arrangements, both formal and informal, 
between MNCs and EWCs is likely to grow, even if an  exponential 
increase is not to be expected (Ibid, p. 85). 
Müller, Platzer and Rüb (2013), in a recent publication, assess the 
quantitative increase of transnational agreements in the metalworking 
sector, including also the undocumented agreements, and their potential 
future increase. The data have been collected through more than 80 
interviews to EWC members, based on a semi-standardized 
questionnaire. Both formal and informal agreements where EWC were 
actively involved in the negotiation and conclusion had been included. By 
“informal arrangements” is meant those agreements between the 
management and the EWC, not having a written form (Mueller et al. 
2013, p. 9). 
The core point of the study is to evaluate the EWCs’ approach 
towards transnational negotiations in the metalworking sector. The 57% 
of the agreements concluded with involvement of EWCs has been found 
in accordance with the EMF statutory procedure (Mueller et al. 2013). 
The researchers found out that the EWC age plays a role in the 
conclusion of transnational collective agreements. Indeed, “the 
overwhelming majority (91%) of European Works Councils in the 
metalworking sector that have negotiated and concluded formal 
transnational agreements are more than ten years old and none of them 
have existed for five years or less (91%) has existed for over ten years” 
(Mueller et al. 2013, p. 64). The authors conclude that transnational 
collective bargaining is a step that the EWCs are able to make once they 
have strengthen their internal structure and the EWC representatives 
have learned how to communicate among themselves and with corporate 
management (Ibid, p.64). 
As to the influence that the EWC chair nationality can have over 
the negotiation of EFAs is significant. The data reveals that, where the 
EWC chair is German, the EWCs have been actively involved in the 
conclusion of both formal and informal agreements. While, EWCs with 
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French chairs are far less engaged in collective negotiation (Mueller et al. 
2013, p. 66). In the case of formal agreements it is generally the 
management that takes the initiative and, if this happens, all EWCs 
interviewed seem to be very keen to positively engage in negotiations 
and willing to conclude the agreement (Mueller et al. 2013, p. 68).  
Besides the importance of the topics dealt with in the agreements, 
such as restructuring or health and safety, also other reasons motivate 
the EWCs to negotiate agreements at company level. Especially, when it 
comes to formal agreements, the general feeling is that, even if the 
agreement may not be excellent, the negotiation in itself will, first, foster 
the consolidation of the EWC, second, it will reinforce the role and the 
legitimacy of the EWC face to the management (Mueller et al. 2013, p. 
69).  
The vast majority of EWCs that have not negotiated or concluded 
any agreement expressed the need to enter into negotiations. The EWC 
members of German companies were the ones expressing the least this 
need, mainly due to the general structure of the company that well 
integrated the EWC (Mueller et al. 2013, p. 70). 
The survey moves on analyzing the reasons why some EWCs do 
not enter into negotiations with the management. In most of the cases, 
the main cause is a structural inability. For instance, members do not 
have regular contacts, communications are difficult due to language 
obstacles and the existence of very different cultures of industrial 
relations within the same EWC, coupled with the tendency of the 
representatives to pursue national interests, does not help to create a 
solid basis to negotiate. Other reasons cited are, inter alia, the lack of 
interest of members, or the feeling that it is worthwhile to first 
strengthen the information and consultation rights before moving to the 
negotiation (Mueller et al. 2013, p. 75). 
The fact that EWCs may carry out collective negotiation at 
company level is not uninteresting to trade unions, mainly for two 
reasons. First, the topics dealt with in the European agreements may be 
relevant for the collective bargaining at national level, thus causing an 
uncomfortable overlapping. Second, the authors highlight that European 
industrial relations will be shaped according to what the practice is now, 
therefore, they seem to imply that a negotiating role for the EWC may 
favour a European IRS not strongly trade union-centric (Mueller et al 
2011, p. 221). Moreover, we can remind that EWCs, operating without 
sectoral level coordination by EIFs, risk to foster the creation of a form of 
"transnational micro-corporatism" (Schulten 1996). 
Someone strongly concludes that, notwithstanding the undeniable 
number of texts signed by EWCs, these bodies cannot be considered 
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reliable trade union tools and it would be misleading to think that they 
could be the foundation for “a reliable structure for collective bargaining 
at cross-border level” (Leonardi p. 26; Cilento 2012, p. 122). 
For these, and other, reasons, the European Trade Unions, both 
the Confederation (ETUC) and the Trade union Federations (ETUFs), are 
strongly emphasizing the central role of the trade unions as negotiators 
of collective agreements (Leonardi p. 26). Consistently, ETUC tried to 
highlight the importance of a clear role of ETUFs within the EWCs, also in 
the occasion of the revision of Directive 95/45/EC (ETUC 2004).  
In order to make sure that the primacy of trade unions over 
collective bargaining will be maintained also at European level, and to 
avoid a too strong detachment of them from the EWCs, it is very 
important for the European federations to foster the trade union presence 
in EFAs’ negotiations (Mueller et al. 2010, p. 516). Especially, the ETUC 
judges the ETUFs to be the most adequate organizations to fulfil this role 
(Cilento 2012, p.122).  Moreover, the best way to overcome the 
competition that can arise between trade unions and EWCs, about who 
should negotiate the European level collective agreements, is to build a 
real and stable cooperation among whole the players involved and 
interested (Alaimo 2012 p.57). Indeed, Da Costa and others (2012) 
found out that, in general, a crucial factor for the successful conclusion of 
EFAs is the coordination between all the actors at EU and national level 
(Da Costa et al. 2012, p. 134). 
The ETUFs have tried to achieve these goals by framing clear rule 
and internal mandating procedures for the EFAs’ negotiation, providing 
for the inclusion of unionized EWC members both in the procedure and in 
the follow-up  (Alaimo 2012, p. 68). In the following chapter what this 
strategy entails will be clarified. 
As far as the negotiating agents are concerned, the proposal for 
an optional legal framework published in 2014 by the ETUC envisages an 
agreement signed by a legal representative of the employers’ side and at 
least one ETUF or two national labour unions, without automatically 
excluding the EWC. Therefore, the proposal supports a central role of 
trade unions in the negotiation and conclusion of EFAs. Furthermore, 
there must be a disclosure of the mandate to negotiate from both sides, 
however, the parties should be left free on how to operate the mandate. 
4.4 A mandate procedure to negotiate European Framework 
Agreements. 
Nowadays, almost all the European federations have framed 
negotiating procedures to negotiate EFAs (Dufrense 2012). Cilento 
(2012) underlines some common features of the currently existing 
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procedures, included in the ETUFs’ Statute. First, the role of EWCs is 
recognised especially in as much as they create the right environment to 
negotiate transnationally. Second, the European federations are supposed 
to lead the negotiation and conclude the agreement. Third, the national 
unions’ interests are important, but they have to be coordinated within 
the mandate procedures. The forth point follows: democratic principles 
are applied in order to have a wide consensus. Fifth, the idea is always 
that a clear and democratic mandate procedure will strengthen the 
agreement and make them as binding as possible. Last, coordinating 
bodies of the ETUFs are always updated about the negotiation, but the 
implementation phase is of national unions’ competence (Cilento 2012, p. 
124). 
The EMF has pioneered this strategy and developed the first 
detailed procedure (Da Costa et Al. 2012 p. 126; Dufrense 2012). Both 
for this reason, and since the empirical research focuses on a case where 
the EMF, if involved, would have likely applied its mandate procedure, the 
following pages focus exclusively on this case. 
In 2001, the EMF adopted a position paper where it clearly 
declared that trade unions have a monopoly over collective bargaining. 
Four years later, in June 2005, the executive committee of the same 
federation adopted a further paper in order to define a strategy to 
counter the growing phenomenon of cross-border restructuring (EMF 
2005). The key point of the strategy was to establish a trade union 
coordination group that would have, eventually, lead to the definition and 
development of the European company negotiation. In the same years, 
EWCs were developing, both in number and activities; European 
companies seemed more and more opened towards European Collective 
bargaining and, on the other hand, the national tendencies to 
decentralize collective bargaining needed a counter-action to be taken at 
higher level. Additionally, the European Commission announced the 
possibility for a legal framework for European collective bargaining at 
company level (Rueb et al. 2013, pp 85-89).  
In 2004, some national trade unions affiliated to EMF raised some 
concerns with regard to the negotiation of an agreement with Arcerol’s 
management. Especially, they underlined that the EMF did not have a 
specific mandate to negotiate. This triggered a two year discussion, 
within the CB committee, finalized to clarify the negotiating procedure. 
Also the company policy committee, representing the EWCs’ position, the 
executive committee and experts from the national affiliates took active 
part in the process (Rueb et al. 2013, pp 89-93). 
The topics that caused the strongest debates among the affiliates 
were two. First, there were two different positions on the role that the 
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EWCs should have had in the procedure. Some trade unions, IG Metall in 
the lead, supported a proper negotiating role for EWCs, while other 
affiliates rejected the idea that EWCs could have had such a role. Second, 
there was no consent on who should have the authority to sign the 
agreements. Indeed, German trade unions were arguing that also the 
EWC coordinator should be entitled to conclude the agreements. 
Perspective completely rejected by the Italian trade unions that accepted 
as signatories only the EMF representatives (Dufrense 2012, p. 212; 
Rueb et al. 2013, p. 98).  
Obviously, the “Internal EMF Procedure for negotiations at 
multinational company level” (EMF 2006), adopted in June 2006, was the 
result of various compromises. The introduction to the guidelines contains 
some core statements. Indeed, it is underlined that “Collective bargaining 
is a core competence of national trade unions and their local 
representatives” and EWC do not have the mandate to negotiate, which, 
instead, rests with trade unions. Therefore, EMF commits to involve 
national trade unions also in TCB. 
The procedure applies when the company, the EWC or the trade 
unions involved show the will to start a negotiation. The first step 
consists in preliminary information and consultation involving the national 
trade unions, the EMF coordinator, the EWC select committee and the 
interested EWC. In this way the national trade unions agree upon the 
negotiating team (which always includes someone representing the EMF 
and can be composed also by EWC members which are also trade unions 
members) and the main positions to be taken during the negotiation. The 
draft agreement must be approved by the national trade unions (EMF 
2006).  
The mandate for negotiating as well as the approval on the draft 
text must be granted on a case-by-case basis; where possible the 
mandate should be unanimous, however “If unanimity cannot be reached 
then the decision […] should be made by at least a two-thirds majority in 
each country involved.” (par. 2). Only a country representing more than 
5% of the total European workforce can block the negotiations. The 
document underlines that the trade unions are free to use national 
methods to define the majority in their country, however the procedure 
applied should be transparent. The EMF is responsible for signing the 
agreement. The implementation is a matter for national unions, that have 
to respect the relevant national practices and laws (EMF 2006). As a 
consolidated practice, the European trade union’s representative in 
charge of the negotiation explains, during preliminary meetings, the 
mandate procedure to both the management and the EWC. The same 
person will very likely be the spokesperson during all the negotiating 
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meetings (this information were collected during a six week internship at 
the Collective Bargaining and Social Policy department of IndustriAll-
Europe in February and March 2014).  
It has been underlined (Rueb et al. 2013) that there is a duty to 
involve EWC members only in the first phase of the procedure. On the 
contrary trade unions are taken into high considerations. Indeed, each 
main stage of the process needs the approval of national affiliates and 
the minimum requirement for the proposals (negotiating team and draft 
agreements) to be approved is quite high. According to the analysis 
provided by Rueb, Mueller and Platzer (Rueb et al. 2013) there are two 
main reasons for such stringent requirements. First, this would make sure 
that national trade unions remain the main character of the collective 
bargaining story. Second, the fact that the possibility for an opt-out 
clause has not been included makes sure that the agreement will be 
applied widely and at a truly European level. Moreover, “trade unions can 
show employers that they can commit their memberships to agreed 
outcomes” (Rueb et al. 2013, p.96). 
The EMF procedure allows trade unions to be in control of 
transnational collective bargaining. However, a faithful application of the 
procedure is essential to achieve this objective and this is possible only if 
the national trade unions commit towards sharing experiences and 
fostering close cooperation (Mueller et al. 2011, p. 222). This procedure 
is now an appendix to the IndustriAll European Trade Union Statute 
(IndustriAll-Europe 2012). Therefore, it applies to all negotiations with 
MNCs employing a wide range of workers, including chemical, textile, 
energy and metal workers. 
5. GDF Suez Health and Safety agreement. 
5.1 Methodology. 
On the basis of the literature reviewed in this chapter, in order to 
answer my research question, I chose the GDF Suez agreement on Health 
and Safety negotiated by the EWC SNG with the (passive) presence of 
EPSU and EMCEF coordinators. This specific agreement has been chosen 
since not the whole special negotiating body (SNB) signed, therefore, the 
result of the negotiation cannot be considered positive, in as much as the 
workers’ side did not acted in a united way.  
The study of the negotiation is based on semi-structured 
interviews and primary sources. The first interviews were carried out in 
IndustriAll- Europe in March 2014. I choose to talk about the case with 
Bart Samyn (Deputy General) and Isabelle Barthese (Policy Advisor) 
(both of them, at the time of the negotiation, were in the same positions 
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for EMF) who were informed about the negotiation by the FIOM European 
department secretary and got involved with GDF Suez right after the 
conclusion of the Health and Safety EFA. These first explorative 
interviews were necessary for three reasons. First, I had a first idea of 
what the case was about. Second, the respondents clarified some key 
points: how the EMF was informed and by whom; which was the EMF 
position towards the negotiation/conclusion of the agreement; how the 
role of EMF vis-à-vis the GDF Suez management  changed subsequently 
to the negotiation of the Health and Safety agreement. Third, the 
respondents helped me to indentify the key persons to interview to clarify 
how the negotiation developed. 
The interviews with the EWC coordinators from EPSU and EMCEF 
were useful to understand the role of the ETUFs coordinators present in 
GDF Suez EWC and the extent to which they were involved in the 
negotiation. The EPSU representative’s interview happened in written 
form, while with the EMCEF coordinator was interrogated by telephone.  
The EWC members with whom I had telephone interviews are the 
Italian representatives and the French one from CGT. Moreover, I had 
telephone interviews with the person in charged with GDF Suez in Italy in 
2009 and 2010 and with the FIOM European department secretary. 
Thanks to these interviews, carried out from June to August 2014, I was 
able to reconstruct the negotiation and to understand the arguments of 
the national trade unions. Furthermore, the respondents were keen to 
share their points of view on the problems faced during the negotiation 
and on how the obstacles met could be solved.  
The primary sources I consulted are: the agreement itself, letters 
and e-mails (collected in different moments) exchanged between the EMF 
secretariat and the FIOM European department secretary and those 
between the workers’ representatives (both EWC and trade unions) and 
the management.  The content of these primary sources was almost 
always coherent with the answers of the respondents. However,  they 
were really helpful to both clarify the main events’ dates and reconstruct 
faithfully the controversies that arose because of the negotiation. 
5.2 Company overview. 
GDF Suez is a Multinational Company with its headquarter in 
France. It was founded in July 2008, following the incorporation of Suez 
(with French and Belgian origins) by Gaz de France (French company) 
(GDF). It operates in the production and distribution of energy services 
(gdfsuez.com).  
According to the latest data presented by the company, GDF Suez 
has 147.200 employees worldwide and it has activities in 70 countries. In 
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Europe, it employees 133.400 people and the 2013 revenues amounts to 
65.8 billion Euros (gdfsuez.com). 
According to a survey made by EMF, with collaboration of the 
national affiliates, in Europe, in 2010, GDF Suez total employees in the 
metal sector were 24.099, the 13,27% of total employees in Europe (at 
the time). In detail, the metalworkers were spread as follows: 852 in 
Germany, 10263 in Belgium, 2984 in Italy, and 10000 in France. Indeed, 
GDF Suez is not a pure metal company and it was only for the smallest 
part metal, otherwise the main sectors concerned are public services and 
energy (Samyn 2014: Interview). 
As for health and safety, in 2002, Suez had published an 
international Charter on Health and Safety at work. In 2007, the Charter 
was endorsed in an agreement on Health and Safety signed by the Suez 
management and various bargaining agents, among others: the EWC and 
French trade unions (ewcdb.eu). In October 2009, the newly constituted 
GDF Suez decided to renegotiate the agreement originally negotiated at 
Suez. 
The GDF Suez EWC has a complex history and peculiar features3. 
In the following paragraphs, only those aspects useful to understand the 
negotiation of the Health and Safety agreement are highlighted.  
The EWC of Gaz De France was originally negotiated in 2001 
(ewcdb.eu). After the incorporation of Suez, and the establishment of 
GDF Suez, a new EWC fully representative had to be negotiated 
(ewcdb.eu). Eventually, in May 2009 the GDF Suez European Works 
Council agreement was concluded. 
Given that GDF Suez is a very large company (Kerckhofs 2014: 
Interview) and the EWC is composed by nearly 70 persons, it was not 
feasible to negotiate with the whole EWC (Ibid). Therefore, once they had 
to negotiate the GDF Suez EWC, after the 2008 merger, a Special 
Negotiating Body (SNB) was set up. The SNB was established “giving a 
weight” to each country in relation to the percentage of workers present 
in the various countries. In GDF Suez the French trade unions play a 
crucial role (Ibid). However, the French representatives agreed in 
reducing their weight from 60% to nearly 40 %, in order to give more 
space to other countries.  Italy had the right to have only one 
representative in the SNB (two in the EWC of GDF Suez) and the 
mandate was given to Stefano Bassi (Bassi 2014: Interview). 
GDF Suez, as a French company, was aware of the complications 
that may arise from a collective negotiation carried out with the exclusion 
                                                 
3 An article by Isabelle Da Costa and Peter Kerckhofs, providing a case study of the GDF 
Suez EWC, will be published in the next months. 
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of trade unions (Samyn 2014: Interview).  As a consequence, the GDF 
Suez management developed a strategy to make sure that the national 
trade unions would have been involved: the members of the Special 
Negotiating Body (SNB), in order to be considered fully allowed to 
negotiate the GDF Suez EWC agreement, had to request the respective 
national trade unions to provide them with a sort of authorization to 
negotiate on their behalf, something like an informal mandate (Ibid). 
Most, but not all, national trade unions agreed as long as they would 
have been kept informed and no core topics, as wages, would have been 
negotiated (Ibid). In this way the SNB was set up. The management 
request for this sort of mandate from the national trade unions makes the 
GDF Suez EWC a singular case, inasmuch as it is not common among 
MNCs to demand this kind of formal involvement of national trade unions 
in the EWC negotiation. 
For what concerns the EWC coordinators (also sitting in the SNB), 
the ETUFs choose to appoint representatives of the main European 
federations (EPSU and EMCEF4), instead of a trade unionist form a 
national organization. This decision was taken, given the complexity and 
size of the company (Ibid). 
5.2 The negotiation. 
The initiative to negotiate the Health and Safety agreement was 
taken by the management and the first meeting was held at the 
beginning of October 2009. The aim of the company was to conclude the 
agreement as quickly as possible (Textoris 2014: Interview). 
The proper negotiation phase started on the 27th October 2009, 
but the whole negotiation lasted a bit longer than expected (5 months 
instead of 3), due to some pressure coming from one side of the Special 
Negotiating Body (SNB). No specific procedure was applied to the 
negotiation and the SNB had to follow the lead of the company (Textoris 
2014: Interview). In addition, the most part of the agreement has been 
written by the company (Ibid). The company proposed a draft text and 
the SNB studied the text and added some points, however, at first, the 
management was not willing to accept amendments to the text (Ibid).  
In the meantime also an agreement on “anticipation of jobs and 
skills needs” was negotiated, however this analysis will focus on the 
                                                 
4 Currently, the European Federation of Public Service Unions (EPSU) and IndustriAll 
European Federation for Industry and Manufacturing workers (IndustriAll) are the two 
ETUFs concerned with GDF Suez. IndustriAll-Europe was created in May 2012 from a merger 
of the European Metalworkers’ Federation (EMF), the European Mine, Chemical and Energy 
Workers’ Federation (EMCEF) and the European Trade Union Federation: Textile, Clothing, 
Leather and Footwear (ETUF:TCL). 
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negotiation and conclusion of Health and Safety EFA, since the major 
problems arose in this case. 
The agreement was negotiated between the management and the 
special negotiating body (SNB), with the same composition as the one 
that negotiated the EWC agreement (Bassi 2014: Interview). Also in the 
case of the Health and Safety agreement the SNB was operating on the 
basis of the authorization to negotiate originally given from the national 
trade unions. According to EPSU general secretary, this implies that the 
SNB can be understood as a trade union body (Goudriaan 2014: 
Interview). Indeed, both the representatives from CGT and from the 
Italian trade unions confirmed that they had been given an official 
mandate both to participate in the SNB and to negotiate collective 
agreements (Breda 2014: Interview; Textoris 2014: Interview). 
Overall, every member of the negotiating body had an active role, 
meaning that they all shared the experiences and collective agreements 
on Health and Safety in the respective countries (Bassi 2014: Interview). 
Both the EPSU coordinator and the EMCEF coordinator were kept 
informed during the whole process. None of the EWC coordinators neither 
conducted nor took active part in the negotiation. The reason for this 
approach was, according to the EPSU coordinator, that there was no need 
since they were only dealing with the transposition of an already existing 
agreement, which was necessary after the merger of Gdf and Suez in 
2008, only to avoid the content of the text to fell (Epsu.org). Moreover, 
from the interview with the EPSU coordinator, it came out that EMCEF 
and EPSU did not have any contact among them in order to discuss the 
negotiation and they did not even consider the involvement of EMF, since, 
in Goudriaan’s words, “at the time its presence [in the company] was not 
strong” (Goudriaan 2014: Interview). As a matter of fact, the two 
coordinators sitting in the EWC did not have a duty to inform the EMF, on 
the other hand, the Metalworkers’ Federation was not expecting that. 
Indeed, even if it is suggested that perhaps coordination vis-à-vis EMF 
could have gone better, the EMF does not blame the coordinators for not 
having informed them (Samyn 2014: Interview). 
EPSU and EMCEF coordinators were not negotiators, indeed this is 
not one of the roles of the EWC coordinator (Samyn 2014: Interview), 
but the EWC, specifically the SNB, was the negotiator (Ibid). The CGT 
representative confirmed that the coordinators have followed the 
negotiation but they were not negotiating parties and they had no 
mandate from the national unions to do so. In that negotiation, they had 
more an individual role (Textoris 2014: Interview).  
The first problems arose during the third negotiation meeting 
(24/11/2009). In this occasion some EWC members made some negative 
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comments in relation to the last version presented and they expressed 
their disagreement about some core points and about the follow-up to the 
agreement (Letter to GDF Suez Management, 21st December 2009). 
On the 8th December, the company sent to the SNB a text, that 
was supposed to be the “final version” of the Health and Safety 
agreement. The SNB did not react positively to this final version. 
On the 21st of December 2009, some of the trade unionists sitting 
in the special negotiating body sent a letter to the management (Textoris 
2014: Interview). The letter was signed by 10 EWC representatives, 
coming from 9 different countries: Italy, Spain, Czech Republic, Hungry, 
Romania, Belgium,  Poland, Norway and France. 
The initiative to draft the letter came from the Italian and French 
representatives. Afterwards, also other trade unionists sitting in the SNB 
agreed that a number of points had to be revised and joined the letter 
(Textoris 2014: Interview). However, not all SNB members signed the 
letter, even if not in complete disagreement with its content (Ibid). The 
choice to use a letter, co-signed by several EWC members, to officially 
communicate the disagreement was a consequence of the absence of 
clear rules, among the trade unions, on how to deal with the negotiation 
(Ibid). 
The main aim of the letter was to force the management to 
understand that the negotiation was not over yet and to stress that some 
points of the agreement had to be discussed further, inter alia the 
suppression of a working body that as dealing with Health and Safety in 
GDF Suez (Textoris 2014: Interview). 
The first concern, raised in the letter,  referred to the way in which 
the negotiation was conducted and to its rapid conclusion. Secondly, they 
were complaining that the observations made during the meeting on the 
24th had not being taken into consideration in the final text. The SNB 
members made clear that they would have needed a further SNB meeting 
in order to discuss the so called “final version”. In this way, the SNB 
members could have gone through the controversial points and found a 
compromise that would have favoured the signature from all the national 
trade unions. In order to further stress their points, the signatories of the 
letter pointed out that, at that stage, the text could only be considered as 
“a text of company policy or a good conduct code on health and safety” 
(Letter to GDF Suez Management, 21st December 2009. Translation by 
G.F. , original: “un texte de politique d’entreprise ou un code de bonne 
conduit en matière de santé et sécurité”). 
In conclusion, the letter asked the company to delay the signature 
of the agreement and to plan a new meeting (Letter to the GDF Suez 
Management, 21st December 2009). As a result of the letter, a new 
26  GIULIA FROSECCHI 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 119/2015 
meeting to agree upon a final text was organized between the SNB and 
the management.  Subsequently, the text was modified and shared with 
the whole EWC to be signed  and no further meeting was held (Textoris 
2014: Interview).  
5.3 Conclusion and Implementation. 
Most of the SNB agreed in accepting the changes proposed by the 
management, since, according to some trade unions, they represented a 
good compromise (Textoris 2014: Interview). Only the Italian trade 
unions did not find the outcome satisfactory. According to them the 
management was welcoming only minor changes, which would not have 
been meaningful enough (Bassi 2014: Interview).  
On the 23rd of February, the agreement was signed by the 
management and by the whole SNB, but Stefano Bassi, the 
representative for the Italian federations concerned (9 trade unions in 
all). Bassi received pressures from the management to sign the 
agreement, even if just personally, notwithstanding the disagreement of 
the National trade unions, but he kept the point (Bassi 2014: Interview).   
The two EWC coordinators, maybe due to the fact that they 
belonged to ETUFs, were also included among the signatory parties (Bassi 
2014: Interview). EPSU coordinator decided to sign the agreement since 
none of the affiliates, including the Italian unions, opposed to it 
(Goudriaan 2014: Interview). EMCEF did not sign, but gave an official 
reason for this decision later in 2010. It is important to point out that the 
signature of EPSU does not mean anything for the Italian workers. 
Indeed, GDF Suez workers are not represented by any federation 
affiliated to EPSU (Ibid). The management expressed some discontent 
about the missed signature of EMCEF (Barthèse 2014: Interview). 
On the same day of the signature, the company made a press 
release very generally speaking about the conclusion of an agreement on 
Health and Safety. Indeed, it did not even specify who, for the worker’s 
side, signed the text (GDF Suez 2010). 
The Italians were disappointed by the fact that the other national 
trade unions were willing to conclude, although the trade unions from one 
country did not want to sign the agreement. Especially, the feeling was 
that the French trade unions and some organizations from the north and 
east Europe were accelerating the negotiation to conclude the agreement 
(Breda 2014: Interview). 
On the same day of the signature, the CGT released a declaration 
(CGT 2010) where it expressed disappointment on how the negotiation 
was carried out. Especially, it underlined the difficulties to find a 
compromise on the most controversial points. 
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As far as the implementation is concerned, one of the most 
problematic phases of EFAs, the answers are not homogeneous and 
further research should be necessary. The agreement provides for a 
follow-up body, responsible for the implementation of the agreement, 
which is supposed to meet once a year. The follow-up body is composed 
by some EWC members elected, now 15 (Textoris 2014: Interview). 
However, the work of this body is not very relevant because it provides 
statistic surveys on some issues, as  serious accidents, but it does not 
measure the progresses made by the companies or the actions 
undertaken in order to improve health and safety at work (Ibid).  
The agreement has been implemented in France (Textoris 2014: 
Interview). However, the French respondent highlights that the French 
law already protect well the workers, so, in France, it can be really 
meaningful only in few cases. According to the CGT member, in some 
countries something has been done to implement this agreement; 
however, he is aware of the problems related to the EFAs 
implementation. Indeed, for instance, the GDF Suez workers in UK did 
not even know about the agreement on Health and Safety (Ibid). 
In Italy, eventually, the agreement has not been implemented 
(Breda 2014: Interview). The Italian respondents do not acknowledge 
any implementation of the agreement in any country, but France. The 
feeling is that it is only an piece of paper. According to Breda, the fact 
that the agreement has not been widely implemented confirms that it had 
more political, than concrete, purposes (Ibid). The CGT trade unionist 
confirms that this agreement has a symbolic effect for the management, 
that is it is a vitrine sociale (literally translated as “social showcase”). 
However, the French representative underlines the trade unions’ 
responsibilities in order to make good use of an agreement (Textoris 
2014: Interview).  
5.4 The EMF role. 
The EMF became aware of the negotiation only when the Italian 
affiliates, FIOM on the lead, took contacts with them (Samyn 2014: 
Interview). While the negotiation was ongoing the EMF was made aware 
by Sabina Petrucci (FIOM European department) that GDF Suez was 
negotiating two transnational agreements. The trade unionist was 
especially concerned about the one on Health and Safety due to a 
negative evaluation of the text proposed. In this communication the 
Italian federation also asked the EMF to intervene in order to clarify the 
procedure, especially given that nearly 30.000 metal workers in GDF 
Suez are represented by EMF (E-mail to EMF, 19th November 2009). 
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Within the SNB, Bassi repeatedly raised the problem of the 
absence of the EMF, since the beginning of the negotiations (Breda 2014: 
Interview). But the company was not eager to welcome EMF (Bassi 2014: 
Interview). Indeed, the fact that the European federations present at the 
negotiating table were EPSU and EMCEF and the presence of EMF was not 
envisaged was one of the reasons why the Italian trade unions did not 
judged positively the negotiation.   
At that time, the CGT representative did not feel the need to 
involve EMF, since the management had chosen as interlocutors the SNB, 
who had negotiated the EWC agreement, and the general feeling within 
the SNB was that the only ETUFs to be involved were EPSU and EMCEF 
(Textoris 2014: Interview). 
Following the warning of the FIOM representative, on the 22nd of 
January the EMF sent a letter to the GDF Suez management. The letter 
recalled the concern expressed by the national trade unionists on the 21st 
of December letter, about the way in which the negotiation was carried 
out. The Federation also underlined that only the trade unions are 
legitimized to negotiate and sign collective agreements and it reminded 
the existence of an EMF internal procedure to negotiate TCAs, already 
successfully ( e.g the case of Schneider, Thales, etc.). The deputy general 
(Bart Samyn) made clear that the EMF wouldn’t like the case of the 
Health and Safety agreement to be repeated further, since this would 
mean concluding a EFA without the agreement metalworkers’ 
representatives. Indeed, he asked for the EMF to be involved in the 
following negotiations in order to guarantee also the metalworkers’ 
representation (Letter to GDF Suez management, 22nd  January 2010). 
In an email of the 29th of January, Sabina Petrucci informed the 
EMF about an informal answer to the letter of the 22 of January, given to 
the FIOM shop steward sitting in GDF Suez of EWC. At that stage, the 
company seemed still unwilling to negotiate with EMF, since they only 
wanted to negotiate as they had negotiated the EWC agreement (E-mail 
to EMF, 29th January 2010). 
It is interesting that the CGT, although expressing its intention to 
sign the Health and Safety agreement, communicated to the EMF that it 
would appreciate if the metalworkers’ ETUF would take contacts with the 
management (E-mail to EMF, 10th February 2010). On the next day, the 
management met for the first time with EMF and started taking into 
account its concerns (E-mail to the EMF affiliates, 11th February 2010). 
However, the meeting did not deal with the Health and Safety 
agreement, but it was the beginning of a new attitude of the 
management which, from thereon, decided to involve all the three 
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European federations concerned (after EMCEF and EMF merger there are 
only two ETUFs in GDF Suez). 
At the beginning, the management was not willing to change the 
procedure that already existed just because EMF, the smallest ETUF, was 
asking that and they wanted to stick to their usual method (Textoris 
2014: Interview). The argument of the EMF persuaded the company. The 
European Federation made clear that, although of course the company 
was free to chose with whom to negotiate, if the EMF was not involved 
and the mandate procedure not respected, the agreements signed at GDF 
Suez were not going to be implemented for the metalworkers in Europe  
(Samyn 2014: Interview). Moreover, this was not just a problem limited 
to Italy, since also the other affiliates had agreed that the EMF procedure 
application had to be supported (Ibid). Last, according to the French 
representative, the management accepted to apply the procedure, since 
it had already been used in several European companies especially in the 
metal sector (Textoris 2014: Interview). 
For the next negotiation (on equal opportunity at work) a meeting 
was organized among EPSU, EMCEF, EMF and the management (Barthèse 
2014: Interview). In order to change the way of conducting future 
negotiations at GDF Suez, the three ETUFs met. The main reason for a 
meeting as such was to find a compromise among the minor differences 
between EMF and EPSU procedures (the EMCEF one was a pure copy of 
EMF) (Samyn 2014: Interview). EMF, EMCEF and EPSU eventually agreed 
on a procedure. The main points were, first, that there would be only one 
spoke person (Ibid), second, the 2/3 majority necessary to approve the 
agreement was not to be considered for each sector but on the total (the 
three sectors) (Ibid). Moreover, the SNB is still supposed to take part to 
the negotiations (Textoris 2014: Interview).  
As far as the Health and Safety agreement is concerned, EMF left 
the choice to the company whether to open a consultation process on the 
text with the Italian trade unions, in order to implement it in Italy, or not. 
However, they have not done it yet (Samyn 2014: Interview).  
5.5 The Italian perspective and actors’ evaluations.  
All the Italian trade unions present in GDF Suez had given the 
mandate to negotiate to Stefano Bassi. Therefore, Bassi was representing 
all the workers present in the GDF Suez in Italy (Breda 2014: Interview). 
In reality, FIOM was the more active federation in following the process 
and the other federations were not really concerned about the 
negotiation. Therefore, they left quite a space of maneuver to FIOM and 
Bassi and they limited their involvement in adhering to the main, formal, 
decisions (Bassi 2014: Interview). 
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Nevertheless, during the negotiation, the Italian federations were 
constantly updated by Bassi. They often shared comments about the 
proposed texts, they met once in order to discuss the text and they sent 
a letter to the management saying that they would have not signed the 
agreement (Breda 2014: Interview; Bassi 2014: Interview). Ultimately, 
all the trade unions agreed that it could not be implemented in Italy 
(Breda 2014: Interview). The other EWC members were aware that the 
italian trade unions did not sign because of the content of the agreement 
which did not improve the condition of the workers in Italy (Textoris 
2014: Interview). 
The reasons for rejecting the agreement were mainly three. First, 
the Italian trade unions unanimously disagreed on the content of the 
agreement, since it undermined the rights recognised by the Italian law 
on health and safety, in as much as it was giving some responsibilities to 
the workers in case of injury at work or absence of safe conditions (Bassi 
2014: Interview).  
Second, the method was considered wrong because a significant 
European Trade Union Federation was missing (Bassi 2014: Interview; 
Petrucci 2014: Interview). Indeed, according to Petrucci the absence of 
the EMF has been crucial for the Italians to oppose the agreement. The 
trade unionist wrote: “We don’t negotiate without the European Trade 
Union representing us and which is bound to negotiate accordingly with 
the rules contained in the statute. Further, also the content of the final 
text would have been different since the ETUF is constantly sharing and 
discussing the versions with the affiliates” (Petrucci 2014: Interview, 
Translation by G.F.). This attitude is consistent with the Italian approach, 
indeed the Italians have been since the beginning positively strict about 
the correct application of the procedure (Samyn 2014: Interview).  
Third, due to the fact that the trade unions did not have and 
active and meaningful role, the feeling of the Italian organizations was 
that what was going to be concluded was not a real agreement to be 
signed, but just a “company routine” (prassi aziendale) (Breda 2014: 
Interview).  
Overall, the text was considered dangerous both practically and 
politically (Bassi 2014: Interview; Petrucci 2014: Interview). 
On the 7th of April 2010, a joint letter was sent to the Human 
Resources Management of GDF Suez from the nine Italian trade unions 
involved in the company. Namely the federations of metalworkers, 
energy and “commerce” from the three confederations (FIM-CISL, 
FISASCAT-CISL, FLAEI-CISL, FIOM-CGIL, FILCAMS-CGIL, FILCTEM-CGIL, 
UILM-UIL- UILTUCS-UIL, UILCEM-UIL). In the letter it was acknowledged 
that the Italian companies belonging to the body seemed considering the 
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application of the Health and Safety agreement in their plants. The trade 
unions underlined that, since the representative for the Italian 
organizations had not signed the agreement, the text was not enforceable 
in Italy. Therefore, the confederations and the interested federations 
warned the Italian managers not to apply any term and condition not 
agreed with the Italian organizations involved. Instead, the national 
legislation and the collective agreement in place should be applied (Letter 
to the human resource manager of GDF Suez, 7th April 2010.). 
The management replied with a letter of the 17th of May. In brief 
the management argued that, even if the agreement at stake cannot be 
qualified as a national collective agreement in compliance with the Italian 
law, it is anyway enforceable in all European branches of GDF Suez and in 
all the companies where GDF Suez has a dominant influence. This point 
was supported by a weak argument, based on the absence, in article 1.1 
of the agreement (scope of application), of any reference to the fact that 
the agreement should be implemented only in those countries where the 
relative organizations have ratified it (Letter to FIM-CISL et al., 17th May 
2010.). However, in practice, the company did not try to force the 
implementation of the agreement in the Italian plants (Breda 2014: 
Interview; Bassi 2014: Interview). 
The FIOM representative commented on this letter in an e-mail 
addressed to EMF. She made clear that the agreement cannot, in any 
case, be implemented in Italy without an agreement with the national 
trade unions. Finally, the main concern is on a matter of principle: it 
cannot be accepted that an agreement not signed/agreed upon by the 
trade unions of a given state can be implemented within that state (E-
mail to EMF, 18th May 2010).  
On the very same day, the EMF reacted in support of the national 
trade unions facing pressure from the company. The EMF letter’s main 
point was that the GDF Suez agreement on Health and Safety “cannot be 
said to be valid European-wide as the EMF did not sign” it. As a 
consequence, it is in complete discretion of national unions whether to 
endorse the text in the national agreements or not (Letter to GDF Suez 
management, 18th May 2010). Few days later, EMCEF Secretary General 
made a similar statement, adding that the non application of the EMCEF 
Mandate Procedures was  the reason why the European trade union did 
not sign the agreement (Letter to GDF Suez management, 26th May 
2010). We should bear in mind that, at the same time, the three 
European federations were clarifying the procedure to be applied in future 
negotiations. 
For what concerns FIOM, the Italian federation is against a 
negotiating role of the EWCs. According to S.P. “trade unions are not 
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enough represented in EWCs and there are no rules to guarantee 
representation, transparency, democracy and rights of the  minorities. 
The negotiating role of the trade union cannot be replaced by a body not 
elected, under direct owner control” (Petrucci 2014: Interview, translation 
by G.F.), where the independency is not safeguarded. Moreover, the EWC 
is often influenced by the trade unions of the company’s hometown 
(Ibid). As a consequence, the Italian trade unions do not consider as 
EFAs those agreements not signed by the ETUFs and that do not follow a 
mandate procedure (Ibid). 
Moreover, it is noted that the EWC representatives lack the 
necessary expertise  to negotiate at a such high level. That’s why the 
national trade unions had to intervene through letters even if they did not 
participate in the negotiation directly (Breda 2014: Interview) and the 
support of European Federations, and their expertise, is necessary (Ibid; 
Textoris 2014: Interview). Last, Bassi underlines that the distance 
between the EWCs and the workers is really huge (Bassi 2014: 
Interview). 
It is interesting that both Italian and French representatives agree 
on one point: the Health and Safety negotiation was crucial to understand 
how TCB should be carried out and that the involvement of EMF, together 
with a clear procedure, is necessary (Bassi 2014: Interview; Textoris 
2014: Interview).  
Indeed, even if the CGT signed the agreement, the French 
respondent talks about it as a “experimental negotiation” (Textoris 2014: 
Interview, Translation by G.F.), meaning that the negotiation on Health 
and Safety was useful to understand that the EWC needs a well framed 
procedure, well known by the EWC and by the Management, and the 
active involvement of a ETUF. This is especially important since in each 
country there are different negotiating rules, so  when negotiating at 
European level “we need to agree on a frame”(Ibid). 
5.6 Overall assessment.  
The case of GDF Suez is notable for several reasons. First of all, as 
for most of the EFAs so far negotiated (Mueller et al. 2013), the initiative 
to conclude the Health and Safety agreement came from the 
management. What is striking is that this case disconfirm the conclusions 
reached by those scholars assessing the behaviour of French 
multinationals towards EFAs. GDF Suez, deeply rooted in the French 
industrial relations system, choose to negotiate with the EWC and proved 
to be quite reluctant  to engage in negotiations with the EMF and ETUFs 
in general. Indeed, for the Health and Safety agreement, it did not 
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consider any ETUF as negotiating partner, instead it proposed to initiate 
the negotiation to the EWC SNB. 
However, the Special Negotiating Body (SNB), negotiating the 
agreements on behalf of the whole EWC, was not only unionized, but its 
members had also received a sort of mandate to negotiate EFAs by the 
respective national trade unions, after explicit request to do so by the 
management. Notwithstanding that, the SNB has failed both in leading 
the negotiation and conclude a homogeneously accepted agreement. The 
finding is consistent with Waddington (2011)’s suggestion that it is not 
enough, for a EWC to be well functioning,  to be fully unionized. 
For the EWC at stake two coordinators had been appointed, 
moreover, due to the complexity of the company, the role has been taken 
up by representatives of the two main ETUFs: EPSU and EMCEF. 
However, the quality of EPSU and EMCEF coordinators, in relation to the 
negotiation and conclusion of the Health and Safety agreement,  has 
proved not be sufficient to strengthen the EWC during the negotiation 
process (see importance of quality of EWC coordinator in Waddington 
2011). Indeed, the two coordinators did not engage at all in supporting 
the SNB’s requests to the management, as the demands to continue the 
negotiation and edit the text of the agreement in order to find a 
satisfying compromise.  
To this it can be added that some of the respondents mentioned 
the lack of enough expertise of the EWC members and the consequent 
need to be supported by the respective national trade unions. This very 
likely reinforces the already existing tendency of national representatives 
to pursue national interests (Mueller et al. 2013) and does not allow the 
development of a transnational identity within the EWC (Waddington 
2011). Furthermore, given that, the national trade unions have to put 
resources in the ETUF, through affiliation fees (see Chapter 2.2.1), it 
could be argued that it is too much of a burden to also devote resources 
to support EWC members during the negotiation, while the ETUF can 
provide that support. 
The GDF Suez EWC members were quite able to communicate 
among themselves during the negotiation, as showed by the fact that 
they shared the respective experiences on Health and Safety agreements 
during the negotiation and that they managed to draft a joint letter 
addressed to the management, as to put clearly forward their requests. 
However, given the outcome of the negotiation and the different 
understandings of the agreement from the French and Italian trade 
unionists interviewed, it is likely that the level of communication has not 
been enough. Indeed, this is, according to Waddington (2011), one of the 
key features weakening a EWC. 
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Overall, the negotiation was lead by the management and, not 
surprisingly, the SNB members interviewed said that they were 
uncomfortable with the absence of clear and common rules, which did not 
facilitate the development of a strong negotiating role of the SNB, which 
was composed by trade unionists used to very different collective 
bargaining traditions. Indeed, the deep rooted diversities among different 
industrial relation cultures is one of the main reasons why the EWC often 
decides not to engage at all in a transnational negotiation (Mueller et al. 
2013).  
In the end, the SNB members (reflecting the respective national 
trade unions’ viewpoint) did not manage to come to a homogeneous 
judgment of the final text proposed by the company. The final result was 
that the majority of the SNB concluded the agreement, while the member 
representing the 9 Italian trade unions concerned refused to sign it. The 
fact that the majority of the SNB concluded the agreement, 
notwithstanding a lack of common consent on the workers’ side, may be 
linked with a general will to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the management, an 
attitude that Mueller at al. (2013) have proved to be very common 
among EWCs. It is worth to notice that the Italian trade unions were the 
only one demanding for the application of EMF procedure, although that 
procedure was approved by all the EMF affiliates and included in the 
Statute. This can show a lack of common understanding about the role of 
the trade unions as EMF affiliates. 
The reasons why the Italian representative did not sign were 
linked with both the content and the method. The Italian trade unions, 
especially the metalworkers’ federations, wanted the EMF to be involved 
in the negotiation, since the EMF mandate procedure would have assured 
that the trade union role would have been respected and the main goals 
would have been agreed upon by all the affiliates concerned (see EMF 
mandate procedure in this WP). Last, further action was necessary to 
make sure that the Italian companies of the group would have not tried 
to implement the agreement. 
The EMF supported the Italian trade unions position mainly 
through letters and it pushed for being involved in the future 
transnational negotiations at GDF Suez. The management accepted to 
negotiate with the ETUFs only once the EMF made clear that the 
agreements concluded without the EMF signature were not enforceable 
for the metalworkers in Europe, since the European Federation was the 
only institution that could be fully mandated at European level to 
represent metalworkers in TCB. The change of mind of the management 
was also, very likely, due to the fact that major European MNCs had 
already negotiated with the EMF procedure. The agreement surely 
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represented a turning point in the relationship between the workforce 
representatives and GDF Suez management. 
In conclusion, the agreement was never implemented in Italy and 
further research would be needed to understand whether it was 
implemented in other countries, but France. What is striking is that the 
company did not try to reopen the discussion with the Italian trade 
unionists, as suggested by EMF deputy general, in order to find a 
compromise that would have allowed the implementation of the Health 
and Safety agreement also in that country. Therefore, it is legitimate to 
wonder to what extent the agreement was meaningful for the company.  
6. Conclusions.   
The negotiation of the Health and Safety agreement is 
characterized by some interesting, and rather peculiar, aspects. First, 
GDF Suez is one of the few companies where the workforce was 
represented by three (now two) European Trade Union Federations. 
Although EPSU represented the highest number of employees, also the 
other federations (now merged in IndustriAll-Europe) were relevant in the 
company. Second, the Special Negotiating Body was not only fully 
unionized, but it was also mandated by the national trade unions, upon 
express request of the management. This is in itself a peculiar feature, 
but it becomes even more interesting in as much as, notwithstanding the 
acknowledgment and support of the trade unions, the EWC was still in a 
weak position in relation to the negotiation.  
The case study has proved useful to investigate the problems that 
a EWC can encounter if it engages in transnational negotiations at 
company level on its own. Obviously, the research question cannot be 
answered in absolute and definitive terms  by carrying out a single case 
study. The research rather aims at adding empirical findings to the wide 
political and academic debate about which is the best bargaining agent 
and for what reasons.  
Let us now assess which problems came out from the case study 
and how the European Trade Union Federations could, potentially, solve 
these problems.  
The first problem the EWC could face is the lack of enough 
expertise of the EWC members in negotiating EFAs. As far as a unionized 
EWC is concerned, it could be argued that national trade unions may 
provide a remedy by specifically training the respective members sitting 
in the EWC. However, as argued by Waddington (2011) a strong reliance 
over national trade unions does not help in developing a truly European 
identity within the EWC and therefore overcoming the tendency of the 
EWC members to pursue national interests (see Mueller et al. 2013). In 
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brief, both the lack of expertise and a different understanding over the 
EWC functions within the same EWC (reflecting different national 
industrial relations systems) can weaken the role of the EWC as 
negotiator. In order to solve this problem, the EMF procedure wants the 
affiliates to approve the negotiating team, that has to be always 
composed by at least one EMF representative. The compulsory presence 
of the EMF representative is likely to empower the workers’ side and 
avoid weaknesses due to lack of sufficient competences. 
Second, the case study showed that in a negotiation started by 
the management and conducted with the EWC, the management is very 
likely to end up leading the negotiation and it can be highly complex for 
the workers’ side to impose its conditions. This may be also due to the 
lack of enough expertise and independence of the EWC members, which, 
on the one hand have to rely on national trade unions for any kind of 
support (Waddington 2013) and, on the other hand, tend to follow the 
lead of the company, since they are not able to propose a concrete 
alternative, perhaps also due to the lack of enough internal 
communication (Waddington 2011). The proposal of the European 
Metalworkers’ Federation overcomes this problem by imposing a clear 
procedure to both the EWC and the management. It is worthwhile to 
underline that, before starting the negotiation the EMF representative, as 
a consolidated practice, explains the procedure to both the above 
mentioned actors and he clarifies that if the parties do not accept the 
procedure the EMF do not engage at all in the negotiation. 
Third, It can be difficult for the EWC to find a compromise and 
agree upon common goals. This fact becomes even more relevant since 
the EWC, as normally not bound by any procedure, can sign the 
agreement even if a member representing a relevant percentage of the 
total workforce is opposing the agreement for protecting his members’ 
rights. These two interlinked dangers can be due to the lack of enough 
communication (Waddington 2011) and/or the tendency to pursue 
national interests (Mueller et al. 2013), and/or it can be caused by a will 
to please the management (Ibid). First of all, the EMF procedure tries to 
overcome the lack of communication, among the various players 
concerned, and the conflicts between national identities by setting up a 
preliminary meeting where national trade unions, the EMF coordinator, 
the EWC select committee and even the whole EWC, if feasible, gather 
together. At this occasion the actors have the opportunity, first, to 
discuss and share their opinions, second, to agree on two core aspects: 
the composition of the team that should negotiate and the positions to be 
taken during the negotiation. Also the draft agreement has to be 
approved by the involved affiliates. In order to avoid the signature of an 
GDF SUEZ TRANSNATIONAL COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT ON HEALTH AND SAFETY: 
EWC AS NEGOTIATING AGENT AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE ETUF LEADING ROLE 
37 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 119/2015 
agreement not widely accepted, if unanimity cannot be reached, the 
procedure states that the text can be concluded only upon approval of 
the national trade unions representing a strong majority of the European 
workforce concerned. Indeed, a country can block the signature only if it 
represents more than 5% of the total European workforce. 
A lack of unanimous decision over the signature of an agreement 
can happen mainly because of the substantial differences among 
industrial relations systems, however the final objective should be to 
overcome the diversities and reach a wide consent. A case where an 
agreement is signed by the whole negotiating body, but the 
representative of the workforce of an entire country (also representing a 
high percentage of the total workforce) has to be avoided. A situation as 
such gives, to the management, signals of deep divisions within the 
workers’ side. For that reason the EMF procedure aims at avoiding the 
inhomogeneous signature of EFAs and does not envisage the inclusion of  
opt-out clauses. As a result, the agreements signed by EMF (and now 
IndustriAll-Europe) demonstrate the ability of the European labour 
movement to agree on common goals. Furthermore, these texts can be 
broadly applied at European level (Rueb et al. 2013). As a consequence, 
disputes over the companies and countries in which the agreement can 
be implemented, as it was the case for GDF Suez Health and Safety 
agreement, are avoided. 
Overall, the negotiation of the Health and Safety agreement at 
GDF Suez has shown how complex the relationships and interactions 
among the players concerned with European collective bargaining can be. 
This case study illustrates that EWC, national trade unions and ETUFs 
share the common tendency to undervalue the need to build solid forms 
of cooperation among themselves, as well as they underestimate the 
necessity to increase the amount and quality of the communication.   
In conclusion, the case study adds empirical evidences to the 
argument that transnational collective bargaining at European level 
should be led by the ETUFs. However, the research proves that the 
presence of the ETUF in the negotiation needs to come together with the 
proactive application of the ETUFs’ policy on the matter, that is a clear 
mandate procedure, as the one of developed by EMF. As stressed by 
Rueb et al. (2013), the faithful application of the procedure is of key 
importance. At the same time, the national affiliates should be the first 
ones supporting the application of the above mentioned procedure. 
As a final remark, it should be kept in mind that the problems here 
highlighted are problems that could only potentially arise if a EWC 
decides to negotiate without applying a ETUF procedure. Indeed, as a 
result of the analysis of the GDF Suez Health and Safety agreement, it is 
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not argued that if the EWC engages independently in a negotiation with 
the management it will surely encounter the above summarized 
difficulties. It would be interesting to carry out further case studies 
applying the same research question, in order to observe how often and 
to what extent the EWC negotiating EFAs ends up having the same kind 
of problems. 
The analytical frameworks applied to the case study turned out to 
be useful to answer the first part of the research question. Especially, it 
was interesting to see how Waddington (2011)’s conclusions about the 
general problems faced by the EWCs, in exercising the rights provided for 
in the European directive, are also encountered in the context of a 
transnational negotiation. As to the second part of the research question, 
the EMF mandate procedure proved to be able to find a solution to the 
difficulties the EWC can encounter.  
Besides the option to analyse other cases of EFAs negotiated by 
EWCs, by applying the same research question, there is also room to 
further assess this case, by looking at other viewpoints over the 
negotiation and at the implementation-related aspects. Indeed, it would 
be interesting to investigate where the agreement has been implemented 
and to what extent, in order to understand whether the management 
wanted to negotiate the agreement because of the relevance of its 
content, or just as a social showcase.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to assess the negotiation of 
the following agreement on equal opportunity. This EFA has involved the 
three ETUFs and it has been negotiated with a joint procedure. Therefore, 
it allows to practically see if and which improvements the new procedure 
has brought.  
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